We consider a bargaining problem where one of the players, the intellectual property rights owner (IPRO) can allocate licenses for the use of this property among the interested parties (agents). The agents negotiate with him the allocation of licenses and the payments of the licensees to the IPRO. We state …ve axioms and characterize the bargaining solutions which satisfy these axioms. In a solution every agent obtains a weighted average of his individually rational level and his marginal contribution to the set of all players, where the weights are the same across all agents and all bargaining problems. The IPRO obtains the remaining surplus. The symmetric solution is the nucleolus of a naturally related coalitional game. JEL classi…cation: C78; C71; D45
Introduction
Licensing is a common practice of disseminating an intellectual property among interested parties which allows an intellectual property rights owner (thereafter, IPRO) to receive revenue in the form of monetary transfers from the licensees. Since a license fee need not be uniform, i.e., the terms may be negotiated individually, a natural question arises: Who should obtain the license and how to charge each licensee? The value of a license for each interested party depends on who else obtains the license, thus the problem presents signi…cant complexities.
1
The paper deals with an owner of intellectual property rights (IPRO) and potential users of this property. A speci…c context is an innovator of a new technology which is superior to that used by …rms in an oligopolistic industry.
The IPRO can be either an incumbent …rm or an independent research lab.
He can sell licenses for the use of his new technology to any subset of …rms.
Every allocation of licenses determines the payo¤s of the IPRO and the …rms in the industry. We provide a normative (axiomatic) approach to the bargaining between the IPRO and the …rms in the industry about the allocation of licenses and monetary transfers of the …rms in return.
A bargaining solution is a mapping which associates with every bargaining problem a vector of net payo¤s to all players. Indirectly, a solution determines the allocation of licenses and their transfers to the IPRO. We study solutions which satisfy certain requirements (axioms). Our …rst axiom asserts that a solution should be undominated. Namely, for every subset of …rms, there is no other outcome that makes the IPRO and every member of this subset strictly better o¤. The second axiom requires that if two bargaining problems have the same sets of undominated outcomes, then they must have the same solution.
This axiom is similar in spirit to the well known axiom of independence of irrelevant alternatives (Nash, 1950) . It asserts that the dominated outcomes are "irrelevant" and thus should not a¤ect the solution.
2 The third axiom states that a solution should not depend on the unit of measurement. The fourth axiom requires that a solution should not depend on the names of the agents. The last axiom deals with bargaining problems that are composed of two independent industries with two di¤erent sets of …rms. The axiom requires that in this case the net payo¤ of a …rm should depend only on its industry.
We show that in every solution which satis…es the above …ve axioms the IPRO allocates licenses e¢ ciently (that is, the license allocation maximizes the total industry pro…t) and every …rm's net payo¤ is a weighted average of its individually rational level, the amount that it can guarantee irrespective of a licence allocation, and its marginal contribution to the grand coalition.
The IPRO obtains the remaining surplus. Furthermore, these weights are the same across all …rms and across all bargaining problems with any …nite number of …rms. The weights therefore serve as a measure of the bargaining power of the IPRO. They are completely determined by the simple one-…rm problem, where the …rm receives zero without the license and one with it, and the IPRO, who is an outside lab, can obtain by himself only zero. This can be regarded as a symmetric problem: The IPRO and the …rm can each achieve zero by themselves and could obtain one together. If the solution of this speci…c problem is that the IPRO and the …rm obtain and 1 , respectively, then the solution of every bargaining problem with any number of …rms awards every …rm the average of its individually rational level and its marginal contribution to the grand coalition with the same weights ( ; 1 ). A special case, the symmetric solution with = 1=2, coincides with the nucleolus (Schmeidler, 2 A conceptual di¤erence between our axiom and the standard IIA axiom is that in the latter the notion of "irrelevant outcome" depends on a given solution (see the discussion in the text, Section 5).
3 1969) of a naturally related coalitional game.
Though we focus on patent licensing, this paper can be applied to more general bargaining problems, where one "powerful"player (a monopolist or a bureaucrat) has the power to dictate any outcome in a given set of feasible outcomes. One example is an n-player bargaining over a split of a cake where an additional player, an arbitrator, has the exclusive power to dictate any allocation. Another example deals with an information holder who exclusively owns a piece of information relevant to the players in a strategic con ‡ict. He has many ways to transmit part of his information (or all of it) to some (or all)
players (see, e.g., Kamien, Tauman, and Zamir, 1990) . The information holder may bargain with the players about the information to be transmitted to each agent and about their monetary transfers. Another application concerns a group of lobbyists (with, potentially, con ‡icting interests) o¤ering rewards to a policy maker if their desired policy is implemented.
Our framework resembles that of Buch and Tauman (1992) who deal with similar bargaining problems. Their work, however, is con…ned to the special case where the powerful player has no stake in the bargaining, and his only source of income is the agents' transfers. These problems do not apply, for instance, to patent licensing problems where the patent holder is an incumbent …rm. Our axiomatic approach is di¤erent from that of Buch and Tauman, and we argue that our solution is more appealing.
Throughout the paper we assume that the set of outcomes is commonly known. Bernheim and Whinston (1986) (thereafter, BW) consider a similar framework with asymmetric information, where the powerful player (the auctioneer, in BW) has no information about the agents' preferences. 3 The bargaining problem is resolved by an auction. Every agent submits a contingent schedule which speci…es the transfer of the agent to the auctioneer as a 3 Even though the agents themselves are fully informed. BW note that relaxation of this assumption leads to signi…cant complexities.
4 function of the dictated outcome. The schedules are selected simultaneously and they are assumed to be commitments. After observing these schedules, the auctioneer dictates an outcome and collects the corresponding transfers. The BW paper focuses on truthful 4 Nash equilibrium points. It can be shown that in every (submodular) bargaining problem the unique truthful Nash equilibrium outcome coincides with our extreme solution, where the bargaining power of the powerful player is minimal.
As for the application to patent licensing, a plethora of works approach this problem noncooperatively, employing as pricing mechanisms upfront fees, royalties, auctions, and their combinations (see Kamien, 1992 , for a comprehensive survey of early literature; see also Sen and Tauman, 2007 , and the references within). Tauman 
Notations and De…nitions
Our model deals with an in…nite set of potential agents and an intellectual property rights owner (IPRO). We denote by Z = f1; 2; : : :g the set of agents and by 0 the IPRO. A bargaining problem is a pair (N 0 ; X), where N 0 = N [ f0g, N is a …nite subset of Z, and X is a nonempty compact subset of 4 A truthful strategy of an agent in BW is a contingent plan which is characterized by a real number y. The transfer to the monopolist is the di¤erence between the gross payo¤ of the agent and y, as long as this di¤erence is positive; otherwise, the transfer is zero. A truthful Nash equilibrium is a Nash equilibrium where every agent plays a truthful strategy. Let (N 0 ; X) be an (n + 1)-player bargaining problem, that is, jN 0 j = n + 1.
For simplicity, we will always assume that N 0 = f0; 1; : : : ; ng. Denote by X n+1 the class of all (n + 1)-player bargaining problems, and let X = S 1 k=1 X k . For (N 0 ; X) 2 X , suppose that an outcome x 2 X, x = (x 0 ; x 1 ; : : : ; x n ); is dictated. Then every agent i 2 N obtains the gross payo¤ x i and pays z i , 0 z i x i , to the IPRO, thus receiving the net payo¤ y i = x i z i . The IPRO receives the net payo¤ y 0 = x 0 + P i2N z i . Let y = (y 0 ; y 1 ; : : : ; y n ). It is important to note that the IPRO must select an outcome in X no matter whether he reaches an agreement with the agents or not. If the IPRO has an option to do nothing, then the "inaction"outcome must be in X.
For any subset S N let S 0 = S [ f0g. An outcome x 2 X is said to be
For a bargaining problem (N 0 ; X), the individually rational level d i (X) of an agent i 2 N is the gross payo¤ that i can guarantee to obtain. Formally, 6 the individually rational level of the IPRO is
The individually rational level of every agent i is the gross payo¤ guaranteed to the agent irrespective of the dictated outcome
De…nition Let (N 0 ; X) 2 X . A net payo¤ vector y = (y 0 ; y 1 ; : : : ; y n ) is
(ii) y i x i for every i 2 S and y j = x j for every j 2 N nS,
A net payo¤ vector y is feasible for S 0 if it is feasible for S 0 at some x 2 X.
A net payo¤ vector y is feasible if it is feasible for N 0 .
Condition (i) requires that every player in S 0 obtains at least his individually rational level; (ii) requires that only transfers from the agents in S to the IPRO are allowed (and agents not in S obtain their gross payo¤s); condition (iii) requires that the total payo¤ of S 0 obtained from an outcome x is distributed entirely among the players in S 0 , i.e., nothing is transferred to an outside party or wasted.
Let (N 0 ; X) 2 X and x 2 X. Denote by Y (x) the set of net payo¤ vectors which are feasible at x and let Y (X) be the set of net payo¤ vectors which are
5 Alternative de…nitions of the individual rationality that do not change the resuts of the paper are discussed in Remark 2 (Section 6) below.
3 Stability
Let (N 0 ; X) be a bargaining problem in X . Let S N , S 0 = S [ f0g, and y; y 0 2 Y (X). We say that y 0 dominates y via S 0 if y 0 is feasible for S 0 and
In other words, a payo¤ vector y is stable if the IPRO cannot …nd a subset S of agents and a feasible payo¤ vector y 0 for S 0 so that he and everyone in S are strictly better o¤.
Proof. Let y 2 Y (X) be non-stable, that is, there is S N and y 0 feasible for S 0 such that y i < y 0 i for all i 2 S 0 . Hence, there is x 2 X such that
Conversely, let y 2 Y (X) be stable. Suppose to the contrary that X i2S 0
T 6 = ? and 0 6 2 T (if y 0 <x 0 , then y is dominated via f0g by y 0 2 argmax
x j ; j 2 N nT;
where " > 0 is small enough, such that w j = y j + " <x j for all j 2 T and
Since d j (X) y j < w j <x j for all j 2 T and P j2T 0 w j = P j2T 0xj , w is feasible for T 0 atx. But w j > y j for all j 2 T , and by (1)
Hence, y is dominated by w via T 0 , a contradiction.
Denote by ST (X) the set of stable net payo¤ vectors in a bargaining prob-
A payo¤ vector y 2 Y (X) is e¢ cient if it is feasible at some e¢ cient outcome in X, i.e., if there is x 2 E(X) such that y 2 Y (x ).
Corollary 1 If y 2 Y (X) is stable, then it is e¢ cient. Let (N 0 ; X) be a bargaining problem in X . We associate with (N 0 ; X) the game in coalitional form (N 0 ; V X ), for which the worth of every coalition S is the highest total payo¤ that it can guarantee to its members,
Related Games in Coalitional Form
The core of (N 0 ; V X ) is denoted by C V X and is de…ned to be the set of all
The following proposition shows that for every bargaining problem (N 0 ; X) in X , the set of stable net payo¤ vectors ST (X) coincides with the core of
The proof appears in the Appendix.
With slight abuse of notations, we shall often refer to the set ST (X) as simply the core of bargaining problem (N 0 ; X).
For every i 2 N and every
A bargaining problem is called submodular if the marginal contribution of every agent to a coalition decreases with the coalition size (with respect to inclusion). Formally:
Denote by X SM the class of submodular bargaining problems. Submodularity is the standard diminishing returns assumption. This class includes the problems with "cut-throat" competition, where the outcomes which bene…t only one of the agents (and yield zero to the rest) are e¢ cient. It is, for instance, n-player bargaining over a split of a cake where the (n + 1)-st player, the IPRO, has the exclusive power to dictate allocation. Another example of a submodular bargaining problem is an interaction of a patent holder of a new technology and the …rms in an oligopolistic industry. The patent holder can sell licenses to use his technology to any number of …rms via up-front fees, royalties, or combinations of the two. An additional licensee …rm increases the total industry pro…t, but in a decreasing rate. The larger is the number of licenses sold, the smaller is the marginal value of an additional license.
The following proposition asserts that every submodular bargaining problem has a nonempty core.
We make use of the following lemma.
Proof.
Suppose that y 2 ST (X). Then (i) and (ii) are immediate by Proposition 2. Conversely, suppose that y satis…es (i) and (ii). By Proposition 2, to prove that y 2 ST (X) it su¢ ces to show that for every S N P i2S 0 y i V X (S 0 ). By (i) and (ii),
+ : : : + M C j n s (N 0 nfj 1 ; : : : ; j n s 1 g; X)
where fj 1 ; j 2 ; : : : ; j n s g = N nS.
Proof of Proposition 3. Consider point y 2 R N 0 de…ned as follows:
By Lemma 1, y is in ST (X).
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An Axiomatic Approach
In this section we de…ne a solution on X SM and present …ve axioms for a solution to satisfy.
De…nition A solution on X SM is a mapping, , which associates with every
We impose the following …ve axioms on . The …rst axiom requires that a solution of every problem is stable.
This assumes that the IPRO will reject a payo¤ vector y if he can reach another settlement y 0 with some subset of agents S N such that every member of S 0 is strictly better o¤ with y 0 than with y. Note that by Corollary 1, if satis…es Axiom 1, then (X) is an e¢ cient payo¤ vector.
The second axiom asserts that only stable net payo¤ vectors are relevant for the solution. That is, any net payo¤ vector which is not stable is not considered to be a credible settlement for the IPRO, thus it should not a¤ect the solution.
Axiom 2 (Stability Dependence (STD)) For every (N 0 ; X) and
This axiom resembles the principle of independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA). Any non-stable net payo¤ vector is "irrelevant", since the IPRO who has the power to dictate any outcome will reject those that can be improved upon. Thus the solution should not depend on "irrelevant"net payo¤ vectors. Note, however, that this axiom is not exactly analogous to Nash (1950)'s IIA. In the Nash bargaining problem, "irrelevance" of outcomes depends on both the speci…c problem and the given solution. Every outcome which is not the solution outcome is irrelevant in the sense that it could be deleted from the set of outcomes without a¤ecting the solution. 6 In contrast, in our context an irrelevant outcome is determined only by the bargaining problem and not by the solution. Given a problem, the irrelevant outcomes are exactly those which are not stable, hence deleting or adding a non-stable outcome does not a¤ect the solution.
Next, we require that a solution does not depend on the unit of measurement.
The next axiom requires that a solution does not depend on the names of the agents. Let (N 0 ; X) 2 X SM and let be a permutation of N = f1; : : : ; ng.
For every x 2 R n , let x 2 R n be such that ( x) i = x (i) for all i 2 N and let
Axiom 4 (Anonymity) Suppose that (N 0 ; X) 2 X SM . For every permuta-
Finally, we require that in a solution the agents'payo¤s are not a¤ected if an independent (payo¤-orthogonal) agent is added to the bargaining problem.
Axiom 5 (Separability) Let (N 0 ; X) 2 X SM , where N 0 = f0; 1; : : : ; ng.
It can be veri…ed that Axioms 1 -5 are independent.
6 However, adding an outcome may a¤ect the solution.
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The Solution
We next characterize the solution on X SM which satis…es the above …ve axioms.
Theorem 1 A solution on X SM satis…es Axioms 1 -5 if and only if there
The solution of every bargaining problem in X SM awards every agent in N a weighted average of her individually rational level and her marginal contribution to the grand coalition. The IPRO extracts the remaining surplus. The weights, ( ; 1 ), are the same across all agents and across all bargaining problems in X SM . Thus, it is su¢ cient to determine for one bargaining problem. The same then applies to all bargaining problems in X SM , with any number of agents. The parameter measures the bargaining power of the IPRO: The greater is , the greater is the payo¤ of the IPRO.
Example. Consider the following one-agent bargaining problemX 2 = f(0; x) 2 R 2 + j 0 x 1g. The IPRO and the agent, each can guarantee 0 on his own, and together they can achieve 1. By Theorem 1,
The theorem asserts that the bargaining power of the IPRO is completely 
The nucleolus of V is de…ned as follows (Schmeidler, 1969) . For every nonempty set S N 0 and every y 2 I V denote the excess of coalition S by
Given y 2 I V de…ne the excess vector (y) 2 R 2 N 0 2 whose components are the excesses e V (S; y), S 6 = N 0 and S 6 = ?, arranged in a decreasing order. The nucleolus of the game is the set of payo¤ vectors N V I V which lexicographically minimizes (y) over I V . The nucleolus is a singleton and it is in the core of V if the core is nonempty (Schmeidler, 1969) .
Proposition 4
The solution 1=2 on X SM is the nucleolus of V X for every
The proof appears in the Appendix. An example of a bargaining problem which is in X but not necessarily submodular is one which involves a limited capacity technology. A small coalition of players can increase its output by adding a player (perhaps, with an increasing rate due to economy of scale) more than a large coalition which has already reached the capacity limit.
Remark 2 A possible alternative de…nition of the individual rationality is as follows. Suppose that if an agent i unilaterally leaves the bargaining table, the IPRO dictates an outcome x = (x 0 ; x 1 ; : : : ; x n ) which is e¢ cient for the players in N 0 nfig, i.e., x 2 E N 0 nfig (X). In this case, agent i receives
can contain more than one point, i can guarantee only the minimum level of the i-th component in E N 0 nfig (X). We therefore de…ne
A more conservative de…nition takes into account the possibility that i may not be the only one to leave the "bargaining table". In this case, she can only justify a claim of her smallest payo¤ x i among all outcomes x 2 X which are e¢ cient for S 0 , where S varies over all subsets of N nfig, i.e., d i (X) = minfx i :
x 2 E S 0 (X); S N nfigg.
Theorem 1 and the other results presented above hold with either of these two alternative de…nitions of the individual rationality.
Remark 3
We would like to comment on the relationship between our result and that of Buch and Tauman (1992) 
The unique solution of BT is
Namely, each agent receives only his individually rational level, and the IPRO (the ruler, in BT) obtains the surplus. Note that the solution BT coincides with our solution
7 Two Examples
A Monopoly Industry with an Entry Barrier
Consider a monopoly industry with a technological entry barrier. Namely, there is a monopolist (player 1) and n 1 potential entrants (players 2; 3; : : : ; n), n 3. Suppose that the monopolist possesses the exclusive right for some production technology; the potential entrants have access to an inferior technology which does not enable them to compete with the monopolist.
Let player 0, the IPRO, be an outside innovator who possesses a new technology which is as e¢ cient as the monopolist's technology. The IPRO licenses his technology to a subset of …rms of his choice. A licensee …rm has the same cost function as the monopolist.
7 Provided d( ) is given by (7) (see also Remark 2 above).
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Let N = f1; 2; : : : ; ng, let K N nf1g be the set of licensee …rms, and denote k = jKj. Let q i be the quantity produced by …rm i and let Q = P i2N q i . The cost function of every licensee i in K is the same as the cost function of the incumbent monopolist and is given by C(q i ) = cq i . The only producers are the …rms in K [ f1g. The inverse demand function for the product is linear, P (Q) = maxf0; a Qg, where a > c > 0.
We next describe the bargaining problem (N 0 ; X) and compute its solution
The set of outcomes X R n+1 consists of (n + 1)-tuples of the form x(k) = (x 0 (k); : : : ; x n (k)), for any k, 0 k n 1, where
and x j (k) = 0 for every non-licensee j, j 6 = 1. It is straightforward to show that for every i 2 K [ f1g,
Every …rm in a coalition S 0 containing the IPRO has access to the new technology and may become a licensee. Suppose that S 0 contains the incumbent monopolist, i.e., 1 2 S 0 . Then the maximum pro…t that S 0 can obtain is the monopoly pro…t, V X (S 0 ) = (a c) 2 =4, which is achieved for k = 0, namely, by giving no licenses.
Next, suppose that 1 6 2 S 0 . Then the maximum total payo¤ of S 0 is given
If jSj 2, this is maximized for k = 2, and thus
We can now compute the marginal contribution M C i (N 0 ; X) of every player i 2 N . For the incumbent monopolist, we have
For every other …rm i = 2; : : : ; n, we have
, since both N 0 and N 0 nfig contain the incumbent monopolist.
The individually rational level d i (X) of …rm i 2 N is the pro…t that i can guarantee no matter who has access to the new technology. For every potential entrant i = 2; : : : ; n, being a non-licensee and receiving zero pro…t is the worst case, thus d i (X) = 0. For the incumbent monopolist, the worst case is when all …rms use the new technology, i.e.,
Since for all 0 1, the solution is e¢ cient, the IPRO dictates the outcome which maximizes the industry pro…t. Thus the incumbent monopolist will remain the only producer, and the innovation is "shelved". The net payo¤s are given by
i (X) = 0; i = 2; : : : ; n; and
Notice that when the bargaining power of the IPRO is minimal, = 0, the IPRO obtains a half of the monopoly pro…t; with the maximal bargaining power, = 1, he obtains
which is at least 3/4 of the monopoly pro…t (for n = 3), approaching the entire monopoly pro…t as n ! 1. Thus, in every solution , the incumbent monopolist pays to the IPRO at least 1/2 of his pro…t to ensure "shelving"of the new technology.
An Oligopoly Industry with Identical Firms
Consider a Cournot oligopoly industry with n + 1 identical …rms, N 0 = f0; 1; : : : ; ng, producing a single good with a constant return to scale technology. Let c be the (…xed) marginal cost of production. The inverse demand function for the product is linear, P (Q) = maxf0; a Qg, where a > c > 0.
Player 0 (see, e.g., Kamien and Tauman, 2002) . This is the minimal number of licensees that drives the market price to c, the pre-innovation marginal cost. Hence, every non-licensee …rm exits the market. Every producing …rm obtains a per-unit pro…t " and produces " units (the total demand is a c, and (a c)=k = "), thus receiving the pro…t of " 2 . The total industry pro…t is (a c)".
Let us now compute the solution a (X), 0 1. The marginal contribution of every …rm, except for the innovator, is zero. The reason is that for every i 2 N , N 0 nfig includes more than k …rms, and when k of them have access to the new technology, the …rms in N 0 nfig receive the total pro…t of (a c)", while …rm i is forced to exit. Hence, for all i 2 N , M C i (X) = 0 and,
0 (X) = (a c)":
8 For simplicity we assume that a c " is an integer.
It turns out that this result coincides with the non-cooperative result of Kamien and Tauman (2002) , where the innovator sells licenses by an auction.
The innovator chooses a number k and auctions o¤ k licenses. The k highest bidders win and use the new technology. The innovator collects their bids. If n 2( a c " 1), it is optimal to auction o¤ a c "
licenses, and the innovator again extracts (a c)".
Our result is also consistent with Tauman and Watanabe (2007) , who obtained the same equivalence result for the Shapley value, this time in the limit when n increases inde…nitely.
Conclusion
In this paper we provide solutions to bargaining problems involving an IPRO and a set of players. We impose …ve axioms and characterize the solutions 
Appendix Proof of Proposition 2
Let (N 0 ; X) 2 X and let (N 0 ; V X ) be the associated game in coalitional form.
By construction of V X we obtain that y 2 C V X if and only if it satis…es
We shall show that y 2 ST (X) if and only if it satis…es (i) - ( by Proposition 1. The only part which is left to prove is that if y 2 R N 0
. By (i) and (ii), for all i 2 N ,
Lemmata
We make use of the following two lemmata. The proofs are straightforward, and thus omitted. The number of elements of S N will be denoted by s.
Lemma 2 Let (N 0 ; X) and (N 0 ; X 0 ) be in X . Suppose that for some b = (b 0 ; b 1 ; : : : ; b n ) 2 R N 0 and c 2 R ++ ,
Lemma 3 Let (N 0 ; X) 2 X , where N 0 = f0; 1; : : : ; ng.
, where 0 a a 0 . Then
Proof of Theorem 1
Existence. By Lemma 1, satis…es Stability and STD axioms. To verify the Scale Covariance axiom, let (N 0 ; X) and (N 0 ; X 0 ) be in X SM such that for
The Anonymity axiom is trivially satis…ed. Finally, we verify the separability axiom. Let (N 0 ; X) 2 X SM , where N 0 = f0; 1; : : : ; ng. Let Uniqueness (up to the parameter ). Let be a solution on X SM which satis…es Axioms 1 -5. Let X 2 = f(0; x) j 0 x 1g and let 0 (X 2 ) = . Since ST (X 2 ) = fy 2 R 2 + j y 0 + y 1 = 1g, it must be that 1 (X 2 ) = 1 . We shall show that (X) is uniquely determined, given , for all X 2 X SM .
Consider next the bargaining problem in X Since ST (X) = ST ( X (d;b) ), by the STD axiom, (X) = ( X (d;b) ), and (X) is uniquely determined for every X 2 X SM . This completes the proof.
Proof of Proposition 4
Let (N 0 ; X) 2 X SM . Then for every S N and every i 2 N nS, V X (N 0 )
For every y 2 Y (X) and every S N 0 de…ne e X (y; S) = V X (S) X i2S y i :
First, note that for every S N , V X (S) = P i2S d i (X), hence, for all y 2 Y (X); e X (y; S) = X i2S e X (y; fig):
Next, for every S N and every y 2 Y (X), by (8),
By (9) 
Thus,
